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OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Like a pendulum, Tarrion Togbah’s fate has swung back and forth as his request
for a waiver of inadmissibility has made its way through the necessary administrative and
judicial channels. While his application for adjustment of status was pending, Togbah
became ineligible for the adjustment by virtue of a robbery conviction that rendered him
inadmissible. At issue is Togbah’s qualification for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8
U.S.C. § 1159(c), which allows the Attorney General to waive many of the grounds for
inadmissibility enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 1

1

The Government contends that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to review the
claims asserted by Togbah in this case on a habeas petition because Togbah’s challenges
are directed at acts committed to the discretion of the IJ, acting as a designee of the
2

The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted Togbah’s request for waiver on the basis of
assuring family unity, one of the considerations listed in § 1159(c). The Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed the IJ’s grant of waiver, largely based upon the
opinion of the Attorney General in In re Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002), which
highlighted the importance of the seriousness of the alien’s offense in the agency’s
consideration of such waiver requests. The District Court vacated the BIA’s order based
on its view that the Attorney General had overstepped his bounds by emasculating the
statutory considerations and adding offenses to the list of convictions that will render an
alien ineligible for waiver. Accordingly, the District Court granted Togbah’s habeas
petition and remanded to the BIA for consideration of the waiver issue under the standard
that existed prior to the Attorney General’s decision.
On appeal, we fear that the pendulum must swing back once again, as we disagree
with the District Court and conclude that the BIA did not err in its decision to consider
Togbah’s waiver in light of the policy regarding waiver in cases of violent crimes,

Attorney General. We conclude that the District Court did have jurisdiction because
where, as here, statutory limits are placed upon an IJ’s discretionary power – specifically,
an IJ can only grant waiver for the reasons set forth in § 1159(c) – the legal aspects of that
determination are properly explored in habeas proceedings. Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360
F.3d 414, 424 (3d Cir. 2004); cf. Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 690
(9th Cir. 2003) (discussing federal jurisdiction to review acts of discretion guided by
statutory standards in the context of appeals under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)). Thus,
the District Court properly found that it had jurisdiction over Togbah’s petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, and we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final order
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3

articulated by the Attorney General in Jean. However, we believe that further
proceedings are necessary before the agency because Togbah did not have the opportunity
at his initial hearing to address the Attorney General’s opinion in Jean or to attempt to
meet the heightened evidentiary standard it created. Therefore, while we disagree with
the District Court’s rationale, we find that the grant of the writ of habeas corpus is
necessary to remedy the deficiencies, from a due process standpoint, caused by the BIA’s
application of Jean without giving Togbah an opportunity to meet its heightened
evidentiary standard. Accordingly, we will instruct the District Court to remand the
matter to the BIA in order to give Togbah a chance to meet the Jean standard.

I.
Togbah is a 25-year-old native of Liberia. His father, after serving as a
government official in Liberia for several years, entered the United States in April of
1995. After being granted asylum the following October, his father petitioned to have the
rest of his family join him in the United States. That petition was granted in December of
1995, and Togbah arrived in the United States with his mother and his four siblings in
August of 1996. Upon his arrival, he was granted temporary derivative asylum status
under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3), and that status was to be valid until August 22, 1997.
When his asylum status was about to expire, Togbah filed an application seeking
to adjust his immigration status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
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residence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159; 8 C.F.R. § 1209.2. Togbah then waited to be contacted
for examination by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”),2 in order for the
INS to determine whether he was admissible and thereby eligible for a change to lawful
permanent resident status. In August of 1998, when Togbah was 20 years old, he was
arrested in New Jersey. He pled guilty to conspiracy to commit armed robbery and was
sentenced to five years in prison.
The incident leading to his arrest and conviction involved an armed robbery and is
described at various places in the record. Togbah was in a car with three of his friends
when they decided to commit a robbery to obtain money for gas. They followed a woman
in her car, and, when she parked in her driveway, two of Togbah’s friends got out of the
car to rob her. One carried a BB gun, and the other had a baseball bat. They took money
from her and assaulted her, hitting her with the bat and the gun. Then the two young men
returned to the car, leaving the woman on the ground, and they drove away. Togbah did
not physically participate in the robbery or the assault, nor did he attempt to prevent it; he
simply stayed in the car with the fourth young man. When his friends drove away,
Togbah did not know the extent of the victim’s injuries, but he did not call for help. The
arrest that followed was Togbah’s first.

2

Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 451, 116 Stat.
2135, 2195 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 271 (2003)), the functions of the INS were
transferred to various bureaus within the Department of Homeland Security. Because of
the status of the agency at the time the proceedings in this case began, and for ease of
reference, we will continue to refer to the agency as the INS.
5

Togbah was incarcerated at a youthful offender facility in New Jersey, and was
released on probation after serving two and a half years of his sentence. While
incarcerated, Togbah had no disciplinary infractions. Despite the fact that his conviction
rendered him inadmissible and ineligible for adjustment of status, Togbah renewed his
request for admission as a lawful permanent resident before an IJ. Togbah sought a
discretionary waiver of his inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c), urging that he
should be permitted to remain in the United States based on unusual hardship arising out
of his family circumstances. Around the same time, the INS filed a Notice to Appear and
initiated removal proceedings.
In late March of 2001, Togbah appeared before an IJ, conceded that his conviction
rendered him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i), and sought discretionary
waiver of inadmissibility. The IJ agreed to entertain the waiver request and scheduled
hearings on the matter. Togbah was taken into custody for the duration of his
proceedings. While these proceedings were pending, the INS unsuccessfully attempted to
terminate them based on procedural concerns related to the fact that Togbah’s asylum
status had not been finally terminated prior to the filing of the Notice to Appear.
The IJ held extensive hearings on the merits of the waiver issue. Togbah and his
parents testified; the INS called no witnesses. Togbah described the facts surrounding his
arrest in a manner consistent with the police reports and his Presentence Report. His
parents testified that Togbah has no family remaining in Liberia, and that he does not
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speak any of the languages that are spoken there. His father is a permanent U.S. resident
and has been married to Togbah’s mother for over twenty-seven years. Two of Togbah’s
four siblings attended the hearing. None of his siblings have ever been arrested. His
parents testified that they regret what happened, and that they would provide a loving and
supportive environment for Togbah in their Philadelphia home if he were released and
allowed to stay in the United States.
Togbah also offered documentary evidence, including letters from family, friends,
and the Director of Social Services at the youthful offender facility where he served his
sentence, as well as certificates of completion from behavior modification programs that
he completed while at the facility. The INS offered the Presentence Report that had been
prepared when Togbah pled guilty and was sentenced in 1998.
Based on all of the evidence presented to him, the IJ granted Togbah’s request for
waiver of inadmissibility in a written opinion filed in January of 2002. The IJ explicitly
recognized the extraordinary nature of waiver, but found that it was appropriate for
Togbah in order to serve a purpose listed by Congress in the relevant statute, namely, “to
assure family unity.” 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c). According to the IJ, family unity was
particularly compelling in Togbah’s case due to his “strong family unit,” the sincerity of
his parents, and his lack of any connections in Liberia. In the IJ’s view, these factors
outweighed the seriousness of Togbah’s criminal conduct and rendered his case
sufficiently extraordinary to warrant granting waiver. The IJ entered an order granting
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waiver, adjusting Togbah’s status to lawful permanent resident, and ordering his
immediate release from custody. 3
The INS appealed the IJ’s order to the BIA, and Togbah remained in custody while
the appeal was pending. Togbah sought a bond hearing, but the IJ denied the request,
finding that Togbah was considered to be an “arriving alien” under 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q)
once his asylum status ended. This subjected him to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), and the IJ believed he could not re-examine the INS’s decision
to hold Togbah in custody. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B). Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §
1003.1(a)(7), the BIA affirmed the IJ’s custody determination without issuing an opinion.
In July of 2002, the BIA issued an opinion reversing the IJ’s grant of waiver, citing
an intervening decision of the Attorney General as the basis for its reversal. See In re
Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002). The BIA viewed Jean as requiring it to balance
the evidence offered by Togbah in support of the statutory considerations and those
factors listed in Jean against the nature of his offense, essentially resulting in the
application of a heightened burden of proof in the case of an alien seeking waiver after
being convicted of a serious crime. Focusing on the violent nature of Togbah’s offense,
the BIA determined that none of the mitigating considerations served to overcome the

3

Because he adjusted Togbah’s status, it was unnecessary for the IJ to consider
Togbah’s claim that he would be eligible for relief from removal under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”).
8

seriousness of his crime. Thus, the BIA ordered Togbah removed to Liberia.4 In
November of 2002, just prior to his scheduled removal, Togbah filed a petition seeking
habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and
his removal was stayed pending the resolution of the habeas proceedings.
In an opinion dated December 20, 2002, the District Court vacated the BIA’s
removal order. The Court made three determinations, two of which are challenged on this
appeal by the INS. First, the Court concluded that Togbah should have been afforded an
individualized bond hearing because, based on an explicit provision of 8 C.F.R. §
1001.1(q), Togbah’s arrival date excludes him from the subsequently-enacted mandatory
detention provision for arriving aliens. Thus, the Court applied our decision in Patel v.
Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001), and held that Togbah was entitled to the type of
individualized bond hearing that would be accorded to any other admitted, removable
alien who was pursuing his administrative remedies.
Second, the Court decided that the Attorney General, in his Jean opinion,5 had
“overstated his discretionary role and encroached upon powers granted only to Congress.”

4

Togbah also asserted his claim for CAT relief before the BIA, but the BIA deemed the
claim waived. The District Court subsequently determined that the claim was not actually
waived, and the INS conceded that the BIA erred in that respect. This issue is not before
us now, so in addition to the issues we explore in this opinion, Togbah will also be
permitted to pursue his CAT claim following our remand.
5

The Attorney General, using the power granted to him in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i),
directed the BIA to refer Jean to him for review after the BIA considered the case and
rendered a decision. See Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 373-74.
9

This conclusion flowed from the District Court’s reading of Jean as essentially legislating
by adding to § 1159(c) a new type of conviction that renders an alien ineligible for
waiver, despite what the Court viewed as a clear statement by Congress that waiver
should only be categorically denied in cases involving the four types of crimes
specifically enumerated in the statute. The Court vacated Togbah’s removal order and
remanded the matter to the BIA for reconsideration of the waiver issue.
Lastly, the Court determined that Togbah should be permitted to pursue a claim for
relief from removal under the CAT, if such a claim became necessary. Thus, the District
Court granted a writ of habeas corpus and remanded on all three issues. The Government
appeals the first two determinations of the District Court, both of which we will explore
fully below.6

II.
We begin with the language of the waiver statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) states that
“the Attorney General may waive any other provision of [the section of the INA

6

We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a habeas corpus petition.
Duvall v. Elwood, 336 F.3d 228, 229 (3d Cir. 2003). The issues presented by Togbah’s
petition are purely legal in nature, and they require us to examine the application of
statutory provisions contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Because
the INS is charged with administering those statutes, we will defer to the agency’s
reasonable interpretation of them in the event that the statutes are silent or ambiguous
with respect to the issues before us. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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delineating categories of inadmissible aliens] . . . with respect to such an alien [seeking
adjustment of status] for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is
otherwise in the public interest.” The statute explicitly removes from eligibility those
aliens convicted of certain offenses, including trafficking in controlled substances,
espionage, and terrorist activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c). Thus, Togbah was eligible to
request waiver, as his crime is not specifically excluded by the statutory language.
The language of the statute plainly indicates that if a waiver is granted, it must be
based on those aspects listed in the statute, namely, family unity, humanitarian concerns,
and the public interest. Id. In other words, although Congress has placed the decision of
whether to grant waiver within the discretion of the Attorney General and his designees
(including IJs), the grant of discretionary power is not absolute. An IJ would surely run
afoul of the congressional directive if he granted a waiver for reasons other than those set
forth in the statute, or in a case lacking any facts bearing on the enumerated
considerations.
On the other hand, where an IJ finds compelling facts related to one of the
statutory considerations, the statute’s language regarding the grant of waiver does not
compel a certain result. Section 1159(c) states that waiver “may” be granted, rather than
that it “shall” be granted, in appropriate cases. So once a case is deemed appropriate –
based on humanitarian concerns, for example – the statute grants the Attorney General (or
the IJ, acting as his designee) the discretion to decide whether or not to waive in that case.
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Thus, it appears to be within the discretion of the IJ to first assess how compelling the
facts of a given case are with respect to the statutory considerations, and to then consider
any relevant countervailing factors in order to reach a determination regarding waiver.
In Jean, the Attorney General added the violence or dangerousness of the offense
as a factor to be considered in the weighing process under § 1159(c), directing the agency
to balance the “claims of hardship to the respondent’s family against the gravity of her
criminal offense.” Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 383. In doing so, he created a heightened
standard for cases of aliens who are inadmissible due to their convictions for crimes of
violence. Id. He articulated the test as follows:
It would not be a prudent exercise of the discretion afforded to me by this
provision [§ 1159(c)] to grant favorable adjustments of status to violent or
dangerous individuals except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those
involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in
which an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of status adjustment
would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Moreover,
depending on the gravity of the alien’s underlying criminal offense, such a
showing might still be insufficient. . . . For those aliens . . . who engage in
violent criminal acts during their stay here, this country will not offer its
embrace.
Id. at 383-84.
The District Court held that, in Jean, the Attorney General had exceeded his
power. First, the Court found that by focusing on serious crimes as generally rendering
the petitioner ineligible, Jean added a category of crimes to those enumerated in the
statute as convictions that will render an alien ineligible for waiver. Second, the Court
viewed Jean as essentially changing the considerations upon which the agency could rely
12

in granting a request for waiver from those listed in the statute to those listed by the
Attorney General.
We disagree. By articulating additional factors aimed at implementing agency
policy, the Attorney General has neither added a class of aliens to those who are
statutorily ineligible for waiver, nor has he instructed the BIA to ignore the statutory
considerations of family unity, humanitarian concerns, and public interest. Thus, we
conclude that as long as the Attorney General’s decision in Jean was not arbitrary or
capricious, it is a permissible exercise of his statutory discretion in enhancing the waiver
standards for a class of applicants, namely, those convicted of “dangerous and violent”
crimes. See INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 31 (1996). Thus, the BIA could have been – and,
indeed, should have been – guided by the Attorney General’s decision in Jean as it
considered Togbah’s request for waiver.
We conclude that the BIA properly employed the policy articulated in Jean, while
also applying the considerations that are relevant according to the statute. The BIA
recognized the seriousness of Togbah’s conviction, stating that “although the respondent
did not actually beat the victim or carry the gun, he assisted in the commission of a
violent act by his knowledge and his silence.” Thus, the BIA stated its view that “the
adverse factors in [Togbah’s] case [were] considerable.” However, the opinion makes it
clear that the BIA looked past the criminal conduct and considered facts relevant to the
statutory considerations as well. Specifically, the BIA recognized that there were facts
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indicating that “family unity” was a particular concern in Togbah’s case, noting that his
removal would “impose a strain on his family” and cause him hardship upon his return to
Liberia. The BIA, relying on the administrative record made before Jean was published,
declined to grant the waiver.
Nonetheless, it would be unfair to Togbah if we were to permit the Attorney
General to announce a new policy and change the evidentiary burden in cases like his
midstream, without providing him with an opportunity to meet the heightened burden. As
we have indicated, Togbah asserted an argument with respect to family unity throughout
the administrative process, and the Immigration Judge was persuaded by his evidence
related to that factor. However, it is not clear whether Togbah advanced other arguments,
which may now be necessary in order to overcome the purported violent nature of his
crime. For example, he may wish to offer further evidence regarding his level of
participation in the robbery, evidence related to humanitarian concerns and the public
interest, or further facts that would show that his hardship, if deported, is extremely
unusual, in order to meet the new policy announced in Jean. Since the balance has
changed as a result of Jean, we think it only fair that Togbah have the opportunity to
adduce additional evidence or argument, should he wish to do so, in support of his request
for waiver. See Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding a due process
violation and remanding where the court determined that the BIA had created a new
standard in Singh’s case and then applied it to him without giving him a chance to meet
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it); Arrieta v. INS, 117 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1997) (remanding where the IJ applied a
presumption announced in an agency decision that was filed after Arrieta’s relevant
submissions without giving Arrieta a chance to offer evidence to rebut the new
presumption).
Therefore, while we disagree with the District Court’s conclusion regarding the
BIA’s application of Jean in general, we are persuaded that a remand is necessary in order
to prevent the injustice that would arise if a subsequently announced policy formed the
basis for the denial of Togbah’s waiver request.

III.
The Government also challenges the District Court’s order requiring the BIA to
hold an individualized bond hearing for Togbah.7 The District Court based its conclusion
that Togbah was not subject to mandatory detention on our decision in Patel v. Zemski,
275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001). There, we determined that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the
mandatory detention statute applicable to both Patel and Togbah, was unconstitutional.

7

Preliminarily, we reject Togbah’s argument that we lack jurisdiction to consider the
bond issue. Togbah asserts that the question is moot, due to the fact that the INS has
voluntarily released him from custody. A careful review of the procedural history
relevant to this issue persuades us that his release was based on the District Court’s order
vacating the BIA’s order, which was the only administrative or judicial action mandating
Togbah’s detention. In other words, the District Court’s decision regarding bond left the
INS without a basis for keeping Togbah in custody. We have jurisdiction to review that
decision, as the Government asserts before us that, in fact, it does have the statutory
authority to detain Togbah. Thus, the issue is not moot.
15

However, after the District Court filed its opinion in this case, but before the parties filed
their briefs on appeal, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510 (2003), abrogating our decision in Patel and upholding the constitutionality of the
mandatory detention statute. We find no basis for distinguishing Demore or creating an
exception to its holding for Togbah. Accordingly, we are compelled to reverse the
District Court’s ruling regarding the bond hearing and conclude that Togbah may be
detained for the duration of his proceedings without an individualized hearing.

IV.
Because we view the BIA’s application of Jean to Togbah’s case as implicating
due process concerns, as he was not provided with a chance to address the heightened
standard, we conclude that there is a basis for granting the habeas relief sought by
Togbah. Therefore, we agree with the District Court that habeas should be granted so as
to require a remand to the BIA for further proceedings. Accordingly, we will AFFIRM
the ultimate order of the District Court – namely, the order granting the writ of habeas
corpus – but we do so for different reasons. We will REMAND to the District Court,
instructing that the matter should be remanded to the BIA with directions to remand to the
IJ for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The stay of removal will remain in
effect pending completion of the proceedings aforesaid.
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